When the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) replaced the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in July 2024, Section 375 IPC — the provision defining rape — became Section 63 BNS. The wording is almost identical to its predecessor, which means the mountain of Supreme Court and High Court case law built up over decades under Section 375 continues to apply, almost word for word, to Section 63. This blog walks through what Section 63 actually says, why "false promise of marriage" cases keep coming up under it, and how courts have drawn the line between a criminal deception and an ordinary failed relationship.
What Section 63 BNS Actually Says
Section 63 defines rape as sexual intercourse (or other specified acts of penetration) committed by a man with a woman under any of seven circumstances — the most important being without her consent, or with consent obtained in a way the law does not recognise as valid consent. The section itself doesn't spell out every way consent can be invalidated; that job is done by Section 28 BNS (the old Section 90 IPC), which says consent is not real consent if it is given:
- under fear of injury, or
- under a misconception of fact,
provided the man knew, or had reason to believe, that this was the basis on which consent was given.
It is this idea of "misconception of fact" that opens the door to the entire body of "false promise of marriage" jurisprudence. If a woman agrees to sexual intercourse because a man has promised to marry her, and that promise was never genuine, courts have held that her consent was obtained under a misconception of fact — and the act can therefore amount to rape under Section 63.
The Core Question: Was the Promise "False" or Just "Broken"?
This is where most of the litigation — and most of the confusion — sits. Not every relationship that ends after intimacy, and not every marriage promise that doesn't work out, becomes a criminal case. Courts have consistently tried to separate two very different situations:
- A promise that was false from the very beginning — made only to obtain consent, with no real intention of ever marrying the woman. This can amount to rape.
- A promise that was genuine when made but could not be honoured later because of a change in circumstances — family opposition, a fallout, a change of heart, or other bona fide reasons. This is treated as a breach of promise (a civil wrong, at most), not rape.
The entire judicial exercise in these cases is to figure out, from the facts, which of the two situations actually occurred.
Key Judgments That Shaped This Law
Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003)
This was the first major Supreme Court ruling on the subject. The Court acquitted the accused, holding that the complainant — a mature, educated woman fully aware of the likely consequences of her actions — had consented out of her own free will, not because of any misconception of fact. The judgment laid down that consent given by an adult who understands the situation, in the course of a long relationship with a genuine promise of marriage, is not automatically vitiated just because the marriage never happens.
Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2006)
The Court took a firmer line here, holding that where a man obtains a woman's consent through a deliberate, false promise of marriage — intending all along to deceive her — that amounts to rape. This case pushed the doctrine toward greater protection of the complainant where deceit could be shown.
Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013)
This judgment is often cited for drawing the clearest distinction between "rape" and "consensual sex" in promise-of-marriage cases. The Court held that a conviction requires proof that the accused had no real intention to marry the woman from the outset, and that the false promise was the direct reason she consented. A man's later refusal or inability to marry — for reasons that arose after the relationship began — does not, by itself, turn earlier consensual acts into rape.
Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra (2019)
Here, the Supreme Court elaborated on the difference between a "false promise" and a "breach of promise," holding that if the accused had every intention of marrying the woman at the time, but circumstances changed later, it would be a breach of promise — not misconception of fact, and therefore not rape. The Court emphasised that consent given in the course of a genuine, long-term relationship cannot be equated with consent obtained by fraud.
Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019)
The Court reiterated the "inception test": if it can be shown that the accused had no intention to marry the victim at the time consent was given, and the sole reason she consented was the false assurance of marriage, the offence of rape is made out.
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019)
This is the case most frequently cited today, including in recent BNS-era rulings. The Supreme Court held clearly that for criminal liability to arise, the promise of marriage must have been false from the very beginning — not merely unfulfilled. The Court also clarified that the false promise must have a direct nexus with the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act; it isn't enough that a promise existed somewhere in the relationship if it wasn't actually the basis for her consent. Courts continue to apply this two-part test — falsity at inception, plus a direct causal link to consent — as the controlling standard.
Recent BNS-era rulings (2025–2026)
Now that cases are being filed and decided directly under the BNS, High Courts have begun applying this same framework to Section 63 (and its companion, Section 69 BNS, discussed below). In one closely watched 2026 ruling, a High Court refused to quash proceedings against a man who had allegedly kept a woman in an eleven-year relationship on the false assurance of marriage while concealing that he was already married with children. The Court held that such conduct — deceit maintained over a long period, coupled with concealment of a material fact like a subsisting marriage — squarely falls within the scope of deception-based offences under the new code, distinguishing it from cases of genuine relationships that simply ended.
Section 63 vs. Section 69 BNS: A New Wrinkle
The BNS introduced something the IPC never had: a separate, specific offence for sex obtained through deceit. Section 69 BNS criminalises sexual intercourse obtained by "deceitful means" — including a false promise of marriage, concealment of identity, or false promises of employment or promotion — where the act does not amount to rape. It carries a lower maximum sentence (up to 10 years) than rape under Section 63/64 (which carries a minimum of 10 years, up to life).
This has created an important practical question: if a false promise of marriage vitiates consent under Section 28, doesn't that automatically make the act rape under Section 63 — leaving no real work for Section 69 to do? Legal commentators have pointed out this apparent overlap. In practice, courts and prosecutors appear to be using Section 63 for the clearest, most serious cases of deception (especially where force, concealment of a subsisting marriage, or long-term exploitation is involved), and reserving Section 69 for borderline cases of deceit that don't rise to the traditional understanding of rape. This distinction is still developing and is likely to be clarified further as more BNS-specific judgments come in.
So, What Does "Promise" Mean Under Section 63?
Pulling all of this together, a "promise" of marriage only becomes legally relevant to a Section 63 case when all of the following are shown:
- The man made a clear promise (express or reasonably implied) to marry the woman.
- At the time the promise was made, he had no genuine intention of keeping it — it was a device to obtain consent, not a sincere commitment.
- The woman consented to the sexual act because of that promise — there must be a direct link between the false promise and her decision, not just a promise floating somewhere in the background of the relationship.
- The falsity is proved through conduct and circumstances — for example, a concealed existing marriage, refusal to ever meet the woman's family, contradictory behaviour immediately after intimacy, or evidence that marriage was never seriously contemplated.
If, instead, the promise was genuine but circumstances later changed — family opposition, a change of heart, or other bona fide reasons — the courts have been consistent: that is a broken promise, a personal and possibly civil wrong, but not rape under Section 63.
Conclusion
Section 63 BNS hasn't changed the substance of India's rape law — it has simply re-housed decades of Supreme Court reasoning developed under Section 375 IPC into a new numbering. The "false promise of marriage" doctrine remains anchored in the same two questions courts have asked for over twenty years: was the promise false from the start, and did that falsehood actually cause the consent? What has changed is the legal landscape around it — with Section 69 BNS now offering a separate, lesser offence for deception that doesn't meet the high bar of rape, and early BNS-era judgments beginning to map out how the two provisions will work together going forward.
This blog is for general legal information only and does not constitute legal advice. If you are dealing with a matter involving Section 63 or Section 69 BNS, please contact us.