Few questions in Indian criminal law generate as much confusion — and as much litigation — as this one: if two adults enter into a relationship willingly, and it later ends in a promise of marriage going unfulfilled, does that retroactively turn the relationship into rape?
With the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 replacing the Indian Penal Code from July 1, 2024, this question has taken on a new statutory shape. Courts, including the Supreme Court, have continued to refine the answer well into 2026. Here's a clear breakdown of the law and the key judgments shaping it.
The Legal Framework: Section 63, Section 69, and Section 28 BNS
Three provisions work together here:
- Section 63 BNS (earlier Section 375 IPC) defines rape — sexual intercourse without valid consent.
- Section 28 BNS (earlier Section 90 IPC) clarifies that consent given under a "misconception of fact" is not valid consent in the eyes of law.
- Section 69 BNS is genuinely new. It creates a standalone offence for sexual intercourse obtained through "deceitful means" — including a false promise of marriage — that carries a lighter punishment (up to 10 years) than rape, and exists specifically for cases where the stringent legal threshold for rape isn't met.
Before Section 69 existed, false-promise-of-marriage cases were squeezed entirely into the rape framework via Sections 375 and 90 IPC. This produced years of inconsistent rulings, especially in long-term relationships where consent looked voluntary on the surface but was allegedly built on deceit. The introduction of Section 69 was Parliament's attempt to create a middle category — serious enough to punish, but distinct from rape.
So, Can a Consensual Relationship Become Rape?
The short answer courts have consistently given is: only if the consent was never genuine to begin with.
The determining question isn't whether the relationship ended badly, or whether marriage never happened — it's whether the accused had the intention to marry at the time the promise was made. If the promise was genuine and circumstances later changed — family opposition, a change of heart, life events — courts have repeatedly held that this is a broken promise, not rape. If the promise was false from the very outset, made solely to obtain consent, then the consent was legally vitiated, and the case can attract Section 63 (or the new Section 69, depending on the facts).
This test was first crystallized under the old IPC in cases like Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) and Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019), which held that an accused who genuinely intended to marry but was unable to due to unforeseen circumstances cannot be convicted of rape — only a promise that was hollow from inception qualifies. Courts have made clear that these precedents remain fully applicable to prosecutions under the BNS.
Latest Judgments (2025–2026)
Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Supreme Court, April 2026)
In one of the most significant recent rulings, a Supreme Court bench quashed rape and unnatural-sex charges against a man accused of maintaining a physical relationship on a promise of marriage. The complainant had separated from her husband and later created a matrimonial profile while her divorce was still pending; the accused, himself going through a divorce, contacted her through the site, and the two remained in a relationship for several years. The Court held that a long-term relationship between two adults who were fully aware of each other's marital status could not automatically be treated as deception, and that the years-long continuation of the relationship weakened the claim that consent was ever absent.
Jothiragawan v. State (Supreme Court, 2025)
The Supreme Court quashed rape charges under Section 64 BNS, reiterating that a breach of a promise to marry does not amount to rape unless fraudulent intent existed from the very start of the relationship. The Court noted that repeated voluntary interactions between two consenting adults pointed toward genuine consent rather than deception.
Jaspal Singh Kaural v. State of NCT of Delhi (Supreme Court, 2025)
Here, the Court went further and quashed charges at the discharge stage itself, holding that the relationship was consensual from the outset and that there was no material showing dishonest inducement. The judgment reinforced that breakup of a consensual relationship cannot be given a criminal colour simply because it didn't end in marriage, and set out guidance for High Courts on when such complaints can be quashed early — a test balancing the interests of the falsely accused against those of genuine complainants.
Allahabad High Court — Section 69 BNS Ruling (2026)
The Allahabad High Court held that Section 69 BNS, being a new provision, cannot be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred before the BNS came into force. Separately, on the facts of the case — a relationship that continued for over a year, including a period of cohabitation, without any protest from the woman or her family — the Court found this pattern indicative of a consensual relationship rather than one built on a false promise. The Court cautioned that treating every failed promise of marriage as vitiated consent would dilute the threshold for a serious offence and risk overburdening courts with disputes arising from failed relationships rather than genuine sexual offences.
Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. (2025)
In this case, the complainant alleged sexual exploitation on a false promise of marriage spanning 16 years, along with allegations of extortion and intimidation. Courts examining such long-duration claims have generally been skeptical that a relationship extending over many years, continued voluntarily, can be explained away as one continuously procured through deception — treating such prolonged silence and continuation as a strong indicator of actual consent.
The Common Threads Across These Judgments
Looking at this body of case law together, a few consistent principles emerge:
- Intent at the time of the promise is everything. Courts look for evidence that the accused never intended to marry — not just that the marriage never happened.
- Duration and conduct matter. A relationship that continued for months or years, especially with the complainant's family aware and no contemporaneous protest, weighs heavily against a claim of deception.
- Maturity and awareness of the complainant matter. Courts have been more skeptical of false-promise claims involving educated, mature adults who were aware of obstacles (marital status, family opposition, caste or religious differences) to the marriage.
- A broken promise is not automatically a false promise. Family opposition, changed circumstances, or a genuine change of heart do not, by themselves, establish deceit.
- Section 69 BNS is not retroactive and applies only to conduct occurring after July 1, 2024.
Why This Distinction Matters
This isn't a purely academic debate. Getting the line right matters for two reasons that courts have explicitly weighed against each other. On one hand, treating every failed relationship as rape would risk misusing one of the criminal law's most serious offences to settle what are, in substance, personal and emotional disputes — with real reputational and liberty consequences for the accused. On the other hand, an overly narrow reading risks giving genuine predators a shield, allowing calculated deception to escape serious punishment simply because a relationship lasted a while.
It's also worth noting that this remains a genuinely contested area of law and policy. Some legal commentators have criticised Section 69 BNS itself, arguing that carving false-promise cases out of the rape framework and into a lesser offence effectively downgrades the seriousness with which such deception is treated, even where consent was clearly obtained fraudulently. Others argue the provision was necessary precisely because rape cases in this category have historically had very low conviction rates, and a separate, appropriately calibrated offence serves the interests of justice better than stretching Section 63 to fit every failed relationship.
The Bottom Line
A consensual relationship does not automatically become rape simply because it ends without marriage. Under Section 63 BNS (and its predecessor, Section 375 IPC), the deciding factor has consistently been whether the promise of marriage was genuine at the time it was made or a deliberate fabrication used solely to obtain consent. Courts in 2025 and 2026 have continued to apply this test rigorously, quashing several cases where long-term, mutually continued relationships were later recast as rape allegations after they fell apart — while leaving the door open for genuine cases of deception to be prosecuted, whether under Section 63 or the newer Section 69 BNS.
This article is for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case turns on its specific facts and evidence. If you are involved in a matter of this nature, contact us.